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Abstract
Modelling all possible life cycles of a company in a highly competi-
tive economic environment gives a significant advantage to the owner in
his business investment activities. This article proposes and analyses a
dynamic model of a company’s life cycle with known action costs and
transition probabilities, that can be affected by an outside influence. For
this task, the Markov model was utilized. The proposed model is illus-
trated on a task of determining an advertising policy for a car dealership,
that would increase the stock equity of a company. The result demon-
strates the usefulness of a model for use in determining future actions of
a company. We also review multiple models of the influence of outside
factors on a company’s total capitalization.
Keywords: Game theory; investment activities; strategy; optimization problem;
Markov model; advertisement; deterministic model; stochastic model; decision
tree; capitalization; decision-making
1 Introduction.
Dynamic decision-making game is the basis for modelling the influence of posi-
tive and negative factors on a company’s total capitalization. There are multiple
possible models that can be applied to solve this problem. The Deterministic
model takes into account the owner of a company, set of all possible states, dis-
crete time variable, control function and some rational function. The Stochastic
model adds to this a probability of transition from one state to another. We
demonstrate stochastic model on an example by building a decision tree and
finding an optimal strategy for the release of a new product on the national
market. We also look at the probabilistic - deterministic model and demon-
strate it on a simple example.
Markov models are very effective in many different fields which rely on se-
quential decision making. At each step, the decision maker considers the current
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state and makes a decision with a goal to maximize a company’s total capital-
ization, which leads a company to the next state. Action costs and transition
probabilities are mainly responsible for how the system behaves.
As an example of an application of this model, we use a car dealership’s
marketing campaign. We apply our model to help the owner chose an optimal
advertising policy for every city. This model uses transitional probabilities and
profits as input data for Howard’s improvement algorithm. This algorithm is
chosen because of its simplicity and effectiveness in deciding which policy is
optimal.
Many ideas that are used in this work are taken from [1]-[60]
2 Literature Review.
There are some previously conducted studies related to the use of the Markov
model which are summarized below.
Merve Merakli and Simge Kucukyavuz used Markov Decision Processes to solve
an inventory management problem for humanitarian relief operations during a
slow-onset disaster.
C. Drent, S. Kapodistria, and J. A. C. Resing formulated condition based main-
tenance policies under imperfect maintenance at scheduled and unscheduled op-
portunities as a semi-Markov decision process, and used it to find an optimal
policy.
Yu-Yang Zhou and Guang Cheng used Multi-Objective Markov Decision Pro-
cesses in their novel shuffling method against DDoS attacks.
Sebastian Junges, Erika Abraham, Christian Hensel, Nils Jansen, Joost-Pieter
Katoen, Tim Quatmann, Matthias Volk developed multiple analysis algorithms
for parametric Markov chains and Markov decision processes.
Thiago Freitas dos Santos, Paulo E. Santos, Leonardo A. Ferreira, Reinaldo A.
C. Bianchi, Pedro Cabalar used Markov Decision Process to solve spatial puz-
zles.
Takashi Tanaka, Ehsan Nekouei, Ali Reza Pedram, Karl Henrik Johansson
showed that mean-field approximation of a dynamic traffic routing game over
an urban road network leads to the linearly solvable Markov decision process.
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3 Deterministic model of the influence of pos-
itive and negative factors on activities of a
company’s investment activities.
3.1 Informal formalization of the task of constructing and
analysing a deterministic model of the influence of
positive and negative factors on investment activities
of a company.
Let be
Γ = Γ〈N,X = {Xji }n
m
01 , t = {0, 1, ..., n}, U = {uji}n
m
11 , R = {rji }b
m
11 〉
– dynamic decision-making game by an owner of a business with full information.
Here N - the owner of a company, making the decisions. X - set of all states of
a company. t - discrete value, denoting time. U - control function, determining
the transition from state Xi to state Xi+1, Ui+1 : Xi → Xi+1. R - rational
function is given on the set of all controls. The sum value of this function on
controls is called a total win. Depending on what decision is made(control at
the current stage) development of a company occurs according to one of the
schemes, which implies an action of the collection, of positive factors αi, and
negative factors βi, while a company is in state Ω.
Among controls, emerging from the point X we are required to choose a
control with maximum sum total capitalization.
3.2 Formalization of the task of constructing and analysing
a deterministic model of the influence of factors on a
company’s investment activities.
Initially, the owner starts in a state X0 and makes a management decision
uj1 ∈ U1, i.e chooses one of the possible controls in this state. After that company
transitions to state X1. After that, internal and external factors with positive
and negative influence start to affect company’s investment activities. Because
of this growth or decline of capitalization of a company is possible.
For example, the purchase of new equipment causes an increase in production
volume. That, in turn, can cause multiple outcomes. The best one being – an
increase in profits. With stable demand, purchasing new equipment with higher
performance is inadvisable.
During the second step, the owner again makes a management decision uj2 ∈
U2, by choosing from a set of available controls. A company transitions to
the next state - X2.After that, internal and external factors with positive and
negative influence start to affect a company, and so on.
On step n the owner chooses ujn ∈ Un one of the possible controls during this
stage. After that a company transitions to the final step. During a transition
from Xi to Xi+1, a company’s capitalization rises or declines. In final state Xn
3
capitalization of a company is defined as total capitalization during a previous
step.
Thus, the problem will be solved, then a company’s capitalization is be
defined for each point and a maximum will be found.
4 Stochastic model of the influence of negative
and positive factors on a company’s invest-
ment activities.
4.1 Informal formulation of the problem of building and
analysing a stochastic model of the influence of neg-
ative and positive factors on a company’s investment
activities.
Let be
Γ = Γ〈N,X = {Xji }n
m
01 , t = {0, 1, ..., n}, U = {uji}n
m
11 , P = {pji}n
m
11 , R = {rji }b
m
11 〉
– a dynamic decision-making game for the owner of a company, where N – is the
owner, who makes decisions. X – a set of all possible states of a company. t – a
discrete value, denoting time, which determines the step number. U – a control
function, which defines a transition from state Xi to state Xi+1. R – a rational
function, which is defined on a set of all controls. A sum of function R is called
a sum total of company’s capitalization. pji – a probability of transition from
state Xi to state Xi+1.
Among controls, emerging from the point X we are required to choose a
control with maximum sum total capitalization.
4.2 Formulation of the problem of building and analysing
the deterministic model of influences by factors on a
company’s investment activities.
The model is described as follows. On initial stage entrepreneur - is an owner
of a company, in state X0 makes a decision. Then, a company’s investment
activities are affected by both external and internal factors that have either
positive or negative effects. Entrepreneur possesses information, that events of
the second stage from X2 may occur with a certain probability P. The sum
of even probabilities from each stage = 1. The entrepreneur knows possible
outcome options, their probabilities and will there be a rise or fall of a company’s
capitalization, depending on his decision, and by what amount. The uncertainty
lies in the fact that the entrepreneur cannot determine what influence external
factors will have on the choice of a particular decision.
Example.
A company is deciding on the introduction of a new product on the national
market. Uncertainty lies in, how will the market react to a new product. Test
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launch of a new product in the regional market is being considered. This way, the
initial decision, which a company needs to make is – should product’s marketing
start on a regional level. A company states, that launch on a regional market
requires an initial investment of four million dollars, and launch on the national
market required an investment of eighty million dollars. If trial sales at the
regional level are not conducted, the decision to enter the national market can
be made immediately.
A company considers sales number as successful, mediocre or negative, de-
pending on volume sold. For the regional level, this equates to sale volumes
of 500, 200 and 50 thousand units, and for the national 10000, 5000 and 1000
thousand units respectively. Based on the data, from the regional testing of
similar products, a company assesses the probabilities of these three outcomes
as 0.2, 0.7 and 0.1. Besides this, after researching the data about the relation of
regional sales results with subsequent sales on the national market, a company
has managed to estimate the following conditional probabilities.
Conditional probabilities of sales
in the nationwide market
Successful Mediocre Negative
Probability of sales
in the regional market
0.2 Successful 0.75 0.2 0.05
0.7 Mediocre 0.35 0.5 0.15
0.1 Negative 0.05 0.3 0.65
Besides that, it is known, that each sale brings a profit of 25 dollars on both
local and national markets.
The problem is to make a valid strategy for entering (or not entering) the
market with a new product.
Solution: We consider three main components for situations of this type.
After that, we will build a decision tree for this problem.
Let us calculate decision tree’s characteristics.
Probabilities of sales levels in the nationwide market without initial regional
market launch:
• Successful: (0.75 ∗ 0.2) + (0.35 ∗ 0.7) + (0.05 ∗ 0.1) = 0.4
• Mediocre: (0.2 ∗ 0.2) + (0.5 ∗ 0.7) + (0.3 ∗ 0.1) = 0.42
• Negative: (0.05 ∗ 0.2) + (0.15 ∗ 0.7) + (0.65 ∗ 0.1) = 0.18
Revenue from a national market launch:
• Successful: 10000 ∗ 25 = 250000
• Mediocre: 5000 ∗ 25 = 125000
• Negative: 1000 ∗ 25 = 25000
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Profits from a national market launch without initial regional market launch:
• Successful: 250000− 80000 = 170000
• Mediocre: 125000− 80000 = 45000
• Negative: 25000− 80000 = −55000
Results on a national market without initial regional market launch:
0.4 ∗ 250000 + 0.42 ∗ 125000 + 0.18 ∗ 25000− 80000 = 77000
Revenue from a regional market launch:
• Successful: 500 ∗ 25 = 12500
• Mediocre: 200 ∗ 25 = 5000
• Negative: 50 ∗ 25 = 1250
Profits from a regional market launch:
• Successful: 12500− 4000 = 8500
• Mediocre: 5000− 4000 = 1000
• Negative: 1250− 4000 = −2750
Profits from a national market launch with initial successful regional market
launch:
• Successful: 250000− 80000 + 8500 = 178500
• Mediocre: 125000− 80000 + 8500 = 53500
• Negative: 25000− 80000 + 8500 = −46500
Probabilities of sales levels in nationwide market with initial successful regional
market launch:
• Successful: 0.2 ∗ 0.75 = 0.15
• Mediocre: 0.2 ∗ 0.2 = 0.04
• Negative: 0.2 ∗ 0.05 = 0.01
Result on a national market with initial successful regional market launch:
250000 ∗ 0.75 + 125000 ∗ 0.2 + 25000 ∗ 0.05− 80000 + 12500− 4000 = 142250
Profits from a national market launch with initial mediocre regional market
launch:
• Successful: 250000− 80000 + 1000 = 171000
• Mediocre: 125000− 80000 + 1000 = 46000
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• Negative: 25000− 80000 + 1000 = −54000
Probabilities of sales levels in nationwide market with initial mediocre regional
market launch:
• Successful: 0.7 ∗ 0.35 = 0.245
• Mediocre: 0.7 ∗ 0.5 = 0.35
• Negative: 0.7 ∗ 0.15 = 0.105
Result on a national market with initial mediocre regional market launch:
250000 ∗ 0.35 + 125000 ∗ 0.5 + 25000 ∗ 0.15− 80000 + 5000− 4000 = 74750
Profits from a national market launch with initial negative regional market
launch:
• Successful: 250000− 80000− 2750 = 167250
• Mediocre: 125000− 80000− 2750 = 42250
• Negative: 25000− 80000− 2750 = −57750
Probabilities of sales levels in nationwide market with initial negative regional
market launch:
• Successful: 0.1 ∗ 0.05 = 0.005
• Mediocre: 0.1 ∗ 0.3 = 0.03
• Negative: 0.1 ∗ 0.65 = 0.065
Result on a national market with initial negative regional market launch:
250000 ∗ 0.05 + 125000 ∗ 0.3 + 25000 ∗ 0.65− 80000 + 1250− 4000 = −12900
Thus, by analysing the decision tree, we can formulate an optimal strategy
for a company, namely: it is necessary to make a preliminary sales in the re-
gional market and to expand sales at the national level, only if results during
regional trials prove to be successful.
7
Figure 1: Product launch decision tree.
5 Probabilistic - deterministic model of influ-
ences by negative and positive factors on a
company’s investment activities.
5.1 Informal statement of the problem of constructing and
analysing a probabilistic-deterministic model of influ-
ences by negative and positive factors on a company’s
investment activities.
Let be
Γ = Γ〈N,X = {Xji }n1 , t = {0, 1, ..., n}, U = {ut}n1 , R = {rk}c1〉
- a dynamic game of decision-making by the owner of a company with complete
information, where N is the owner of a company making decisions. X is the set
of all company’s states. t - discrete value denoting time. U - control function
that determines the transition from state X to state Xi+1, Ui+1 : Xi → Xi+1.
R - a rational function defined on the set of all controls.
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5.2 Formulation of the problem of building and analysing
a probabilistic - deterministic model of influences by
negative and positive factors on a company’s invest-
ment activities.
Now suppose that the choice of control at a point X does not determine a state,
but only a probability distribution for this state.
Let Xt and Ut be arbitrary finite sets. Each u from Ut is mapped to prob-
ability distribution p on Xt. The function p, that defines the law of transition
from Ut to Xt, will be called the transition function. It is assumed that the point
X0 from the set from which the game begins is also random, and its probability
distribution µ (initial distribution) is given.
The transition from x∈ Xt−1 to Ut is determined by the entrepreneur. In
this case, we choose u not from all of Ut, but from its subset U (x), that is
dependant on the state x. The elements of a set U (x) will be called controls
at a point x. Sets U (x) are defined and not empty for all non-final states. It
is assumed that U (x) do not intersect in pairs and their sum of all x ∈ Xt−1
is equal to Ut. In other words, each control u can be used in one and only one
state. We denote this state as j (u), so the record x = j (u) is equivalent to the
record u ∈ U (x).
On the set of all controls, the current growth or decline of a company’s
capitalization r (u) is given, and on the set of final states - the final growth or
decline of a company’s capitalization r (x) is given.
The model is described as follows. At the initial moment of time, the en-
trepreneur - the owner of a company - makes a decision, chooses a control - a
set of transition probabilities at the current stage. Then the second participant
- nature chooses the next state. For the transition from state 0 to state 1, the
owner receives a certain capitalization of a company.
The purpose of the model is to obtain the maximum capitalization of a
company.
Example.
The column U1 shows three probability distributions on the set X1, corre-
sponding to the three controls fromX0. The column U2 indicates five probability
distributions on the set X2, that correspond to the controls from the state X1.
The problem will be solved if we find the control with the maximum increase in
the capitalization of a company.
In state 3 expected value equals:
0 + 12 ∗ 1 + 12 ∗ 2 = 32
when choosing the first control and equals
1 + 14 ∗ 1 + 34 ∗ 2 = 114
when choosing the second. The estimate of state 3 is equal to the maximum of
these two numbers, i.e. 114 and it is clear that under state 3 one should prefer
the second control.
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Figure 2: Model.
Similarly,
v (IV ) = max
(
2 + 56 ∗ 1 + 16 ∗ 2; 1 + 58 ∗ 1 + 38 ∗ 2
)
= 196 ,
in state 4, the first control is preferable.
v (V ) = max
(
3 + 25 ∗ 1 + 35 ∗ 2; 2 + 1 ∗ 1 + 0 ∗ 2
)
= 235 ,
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In state 5, the first control is more profitable. Next, choosing in state 1 the
first control, and then, acting in an optimal way, we obtain an estimate,
1 + 310 ∗ 114 + 12 ∗ 196 + 15 ∗ 235 = 2597600
and choosing the second state, we obtain an estimate
0 + 0 ∗ 114 + 14 ∗ 196 + 38 ∗ 235 = 15160
6 Stochastic decision-making investment model
of company’s life cycle.
6.1 Informal statement of the problem of constructing
and analysing a stochastic decision-making investment
model of company’s life cycle.
A model Γ = 〈I = {1, 2, ..., n} = {i}k1 ,Ki = {1, 2, ..., ki}, Si = {si}n1 , Ri〉 is con-
sidered, in which the decision-making process is represented by a finite number
of states i, i = 1,2, ..., n.
Let each state i ∈ S = {1, ..., N} correspond to a finite set of solutions (or
alternatives) Ki, the elements of which we denote by numbers 1,...,ki. The space
of strategies K is the direct product of sets of solutions K = K1×K2× ...×Kn.
Exists a matrix P = (pij) of transition probabilities between states. The
reward structure is represented in the form of a matrix R (q) = (rij (q)), the
elements of which are the income values. The matrix of transition probabilities
P and the income matrix R (q) depend on the decision policies k by the decision
maker.
Depending on what decision is made (control at the current stage), the
development of a company proceeds according to one or another scheme, which
implies an influence by a combination of positive factors αi and negative factors
βi on the state of a company Ω.
There is a finite set of company’s states i, which is estimated by the value
of a company’s capitalization per unit of time t. Depending on the decision
taken, a company goes into one of the possible states i. In each state i, the set
of rational strategies k depends on this state.
The goal of the task is to find the optimal strategy that maximizes the
expected capitalization of a company from a process that has a finite number
of stages.
6.2 Formulation of the problem of constructing and analysing
a stochastic decision making investment model of com-
pany’s life cycle.
Let the process of transition from state to state occur, not deterministically, but
stochastically and controlled by the transition matrix P = (pij), where pij is
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the probability that the system at the time t+1 is in the state j, if it is known,
that at the time t it was in the state i.
Consider the case, when the matrix does not depend on time, and decisions
are made at each step. Suppose that at each step one of the sets of such matrices
can be chosen as a transition matrix, and we denote the matrix, corresponding
to policy q, as P (q) = (pij (q)).
Suppose further that not only the state at each step changes but also the
capitalization of a company, which is a function of the initial and final states
and the solution.
Let R (q) = (rij (q)) denote the corresponding matrix of a company’s capi-
talization.
Note that this model is not perfect since the same factor can be both positive
and negative. Examples are a change in technology, personnel, investment, etc.
In order to get the closer details of specific tasks, the stochastic model will be
discussed below using a specific example.
7 Classification of a company’s investment ac-
tivities in the Markov model of control of its
activities.
We introduce a classification based on a company’s key performance indicators
(for example, sales of goods and/or services, productivity, profits, customer
satisfaction, etc.); in this case, we will consider the growth of stock prices, x(t).
We introduce the following indicators:
• growth rate, V (t) = x(t)t ;
• growth acceleration, a (t) = V (t)t .
Thus, if the growth rate is zero, a company is in a stable state (there is no rise
and fall in stock prices); if the growth rate is greater than zero, then a company
is in a state of growth, because its shares are growing; if it is less than zero, then
a company is in decline (stock quote falls). Acceleration largely characterizes
stable conditions not only of a company but also of the stock market as a whole,
since It shows spasmodic processes of rising or falling stock prices.
7.1 Car dealership
Suppose that a car dealership operates in five cities. In any of these cities we
can invest in an advertisement in the following areas:
• 1 - advertisement on the radio;
• 2 - placing ads on the website;
• 3 - placement of advertisements in the printed publication ”Car Bulletin”;
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• 4 - TV adverts;
• 5 - active search for customers.
In each city for all of these fixed policies, the probabilities are set that the
next customer will acquire a car in one of the five cities and the corresponding
income in monetary terms associated with each sale. Since each policy has a dif-
ferent set of clients, transition probabilities and revenues depend on the policies.
Income, in this case, is expressed as a fall or an increase in the capitalization of
a company.
If we assign some hypothetical numbers to them, then these tasks can be
written in a table.
State
(city)
Policy
Transition probability Profit
j = 1 2 3 4 5 i = 1 2 3 4 5
1 1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2 -300 -200 -190 280 -120
2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5 0 940 -270 -600 80 620
3 0.7 0.1 0 0 0.2 -60 100 520 -760 230
4 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.2 20 110 0 390 510
5 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 620 0 -640 250 630
2 1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0 330 680 -240 390
2 0 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.5 270 640 320 0 -480
3 0.1 0.5 0.2 0 0.2 460 -480 0 180 570
4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0 0.2 -320 840 750 730 690
5 0.4 0.3 0.1 0.2 0 560 510 -90 120 0
3 1 0.3 0 0.4 0.2 0.1 170 120 180 -300 280
2 0.5 0.2 0 0.2 0.1 220 -60 150 0 660
3 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.1 110 20 100 -160 90
4 0 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.1 170 170 0 300 -880
5 0.4 0 0.1 0.4 0.1 -660 480 810 830 240
4 1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 -100 0 800 150 560
2 0 0.1 0.2 0.6 0.1 620 560 470 -620 400
3 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 170 250 0 -280 0
4 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0 500 630 920 430 90
5 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 80 510 -110 110 300
5 1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.1 710 -160 50 280 690
2 0.2 0.2 0 0.2 0.4 920 100 600 270 180
3 0 0.1 0.1 0.7 0.1 0 740 710 -60 160
4 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4 500 980 900 220 580
5 0.4 0.1 0.3 0 0.2 520 400 960 60 690
Lets us explain the table using the last row as an example. It shows that
investment in the first policy (advertising on the radio) in the fifth city, will lead
to a probability of 0.1 that there will be a sale in city 1, and there will be an
increase in the capitalization of a company by 710 units. With a probability of
0.3, there will be a sale in city 2 with a loss of 160 units, and a probability of 0.1
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that there will be a sale in city 3, with an income of 50 units, a probability of 0.4
that the sale will occur in city 4, with an income of 280 units and a probability
of 0.1 that there will be a sale in city 5, and the capitalization of a company
will increase by 690 units.
There are five states in this problem, i.e. N = 5, and five policies in states
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, i.e. n1 = 5, n2 = 5, n3 = 5, n4 = 5, n5 = 5. This means that there
are 5 * 5 * 5 * 5 * 5 = 3125 possible policies
Solution:
As the initial approximation, the policy vector D will be chosen as,
D =

1
1
1
1
1

which means that we work in all cities. This is a policy that maximizes the
expected value of a company’s capitalization growth. For this policy, we have a
matrix of transition probabilities P
P =

0.1 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.2
0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
0.3 0 0.4 0.2 0.1
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4
0.1 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.1

The sum
∑N
j=1 pijrij will be denoted as qi, since the expected capitalization
of a company depends only on i. The equation for determining the values of vi,
assuming a value of v3 is zero, is written as
g + v1 = −142 + 0.1v1 + 0.2v2 + 0.4v3 + 0.1v4
g + v2 = 271 + 0.1v1 + 0.2v2 + 0.2v3 + 0.2v4
g + v3 = 91 + 0.3v1 + 0v2 + 0.4v3 + 0.2v4
g + v4 = 299 + 0.2v1 + 0.2v2 + 0.1v3 + 0.1v4
g = 209 + 0.1v1 + 0.3v2 + 0.1v3 + 0.4v4
and have a solution
g = 150.78
v1 = −458.25
v2 = 21.58
v3 = −317.98
v4 = 32.32
v5 = 0
Using the policy of ”advertising on the radio” dealership will have an average
of 150.78 units gained per transaction.
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Referring to the policy improvement procedure, let us calculate the values
of qki +
∑N
j=1 p
k
ijvj for all i and k.
i k qki +
∑N
j=1 p
k
ijvj
1
1 -307.469
2 11.028
3 -304.617
4 90.608
5 177.638 +
2
1 172.359
2 -163.944
3 -178.631
4 206.447 +
5 189.84
3
1 -167.203
2 -54.345
3 -139.267
4 -96.338
5 -29.17 +
4
1 -23.013
2 -562.917
3 -408.7958
4 74.347 +
5 -225.7162
5
1 150.779
2 249.14
3 111.984
4 470.231 +
5 397.464
We see that for i = 1 the value in the right column is maximum for k = 5.
Similarly for i = 3. For i = 2, i = 4 and i = 5 the value is maximum for k = 4.
In other words, the new policy will be determined by vector D.
D =

5
4
5
4
4

This means that in the first, third and fifth cities it is most advantageous to
use the 5th policy and for the second and fourth cities to use the fourth.
Now we have
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P =

0.2 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2
0.3 0.2 0.3 0 0.2
0.4 0 0.1 0.4 0.1
0.3 0.1 0.1 0.5 0
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.4
 [qi] =

209
330
119
536
674

Let us solve the equations
g + v1 = 209 + 0.2v1 + 0.1v2 + 0.1v3 + 0.4v4 + 0.2v5
g + v2 = 330 + 0.3v1 + 0.2v2 + 0.3v3 + 0v4 + 0.2v5
g + v3 = 119 + 0.4v1 + 0v2 + 0.1v3 + 0.4v4 + 0.1v5
g + v4 = 536 + 0.3v1 + 0.1v2 + 0.1v3 + 0.5v4 + 0v5
g + v5 = 674 + 0.1v1 + 0.1v2 + 0.1v3 + 0.3v4 + 0.4v5
Assuming again that v5 is zero, we get
g = 400.633
v1 = −551.143
v2 = −555.888
v3 = −695.783
v4 = −310.286
v5 = 0
Note that g has increased from 150.79 to 400.633, so the agency earns an av-
erage of 400.633 units per transaction. Using the policy improvement algorithm
for these values, we calculate the values qki +
∑N
j=1 p
k
ijvj for all i and k.
16
i k temp
1
1 -617.6337
2 -332.1275
3 -427.3889
4 -164.0598
5 -73.5101 +
2
1 -96.5057
2 -362.2529
3 -552.2149
4 -50.2554 +
5 -126.8591
3
1 -414.7133
2 -284.8063
3 -487.212
4 -407.9878
5 -241.1499 +
4
1 183.1
2 -224.046
3 -198.301
4 369.045 +
5 47.433
5
1 -206.5734
2 46.5366
3 -223.3673
4 262.6328 +
5 189.2191
The new policy is thus determined by the vector D.
D =

5
4
5
4
4

Which coincides with the vector of the previous policy, the process has con-
verged, and the value reached its maximum equal to 400.633. The agency must
actively search for clients in the first and third city, but use TV adverts in the
rest. The application of this policy will give, on average, per transaction, an
income of 419.2 units.
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